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  Abstract  
Almost three years have passed since the ‘Arab Spring’ began in late 2010. In the major sites of 
popular uprisings, political conditions remain unsettled or violent. Despite similarities in their 
original opposition to authoritarian rule, the outcomes differed from country to country. In 
Tunisia and Egypt, processes of transiting from authoritarian rule produced contrasting 
consequences for democratic politics. Uprisings led to armed rebellion in Libya and Syria, but 
whereas Gaddafi was overthrown, Asad was not. What explains the different trajectories and 
outcomes of the Arab Spring? How were these shaped by the power structure and levels of social 
control of the pre-uprising regimes and their state institutions, on the one hand, and by the 
character of the societies and oppositional forces that rose against them? Comparing Tunisia with 
Egypt, and Libya with Syria, this paper discusses various factors that account for variations in the 
trajectories and outcomes of the Arab Spring, namely, the legacy of the previous regime, 
institutional and constitutional choices during “transition” from authoritarian rule, socioeconomic 
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Trajectories and Outcomes of the ‘Arab Spring’: 
Comparing Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria 
 
Almost three years have passed since the ‘Arab Spring’ began in late 2010. In the 
major sites of popular uprisings, political conditions remain unsettled or violent. 
Despite similarities in their original opposition to authoritarian rule, the outcomes 
differed from country to country. In Tunisia and Egypt, processes of transiting from 
authoritarian rule produced contrasting consequences for democratic politics. 
Uprisings led to armed rebellion in Libya and Syria, but whereas Gaddafi was 
overthrown, Asad was not. What explains the different trajectories and outcomes of 
the Arab Spring? How were these shaped by the power structure and levels of social 
control of the pre-uprising regimes and their state institutions, on the one hand, and 
by the character of the societies and oppositional forces that rose against them? 
Comparing Tunisia with Egypt, and Libya with Syria, this paper discusses various 
factors that account for variations in the trajectories and outcomes of the Arab 
Spring, namely, the legacy of the previous regime, institutional and constitutional 
choices during “transition” from authoritarian rule, socioeconomic conditions, and 
the presence of absence of ethnic, sectarian and geographic diversity.  
The popular uprisings that started in Tunisia in December 2010 led to 
revolts and uprisings across much of the Arab world. The unprecedented protests, 
demanding human dignity, freedom and social justice, underwent different 
trajectories and produced different outcomes. Whereas Tunisia and Egypt 
experienced regime transitions, other countries, such as Morocco and Jordan, 
preempted sociopolitical reform with a combination of economic compensation and 
religious discourse, partly aided by Saudi Arabia and the wealthy Arab Gulf states. 
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With events still unfolding in unpredictable ways, it is difficult to evaluate the 
prospects for democratization and regime change. This short paper does not claim to 
provide a comprehensive treatment of many factors of many kinds that shaped the 
trajectories of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. It suggests, 
however, the importance of considering the interplay between the types of 
pre-uprising regimes, their institutional frames and their relations to the state; the 
sociocultural characteristics of the societies under authoritarian rule and their impact 
on national mobilization; and, most of all, specific difficulties and conflicts that 
attended the transition from authoritarian rule. Focusing on these factors, the paper 
contrasts the relative success of Tunisia’s move towards democratic politics with the 
short-lived rise of the MB in Egypt, and compares the relatively rapid collapse of the 
Gaddafi regime with the ability of the Asad regime to resist large-scale armed 
rebellion. 
 
Tunisia and Egypt 
Within the Arab world, Egypt and Tunisia have long shown a high degree 
of national identity and social homogeneity. Unlike in other Arab countries, the 
people in Egypt and Tunisia affiliated themselves with the state and did not imagine 
themselves to be the arbitrary creations of imperialism, as was the case in the Levant 
or Libya where identifiable nation did not exist before independence. Moreover, a 
history of centralized rule allowed the state and its institutions in Tunisia and Egypt 
to differentiate themselves from specific regimes. Their regimes were harshly 
authoritarian but state institutionalization reached sufficiently high levels as to be 
able to separate civil from state institutions even before the formation of 
post-colonial regimes. As a result, specific regimes did not politicize civil society 
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and state institutions to the point of having them serve regime ideology and interests 
alone. Moreover, the weak ideological or political identification of the regime with 
the state allowed for a relative separation of the regime from the military such that 
the latter, regardless of its intentions, could claim to serve national rather than solely 
regime interests. (Such separation did not exist in Syria which has practically no 
distinction between the ruler, his family and the ruling party.) To some extent, that 
separation allowed the first phase of the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia to end with 
the quick overthrow of their respective presidents when state institutions, most 
importantly the army, abandoned Mubarak and Ben Ali.  
 
There was a stark difference between the two countries, however. In 
Tunisia, the military took a neutral stance from the regime and the revolution and 
the head of parliament replaced the president according to the constitution. The 
military in Egypt temporarily sided with the 2011 January ‘Revolution’, formed a 
council, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and took over the 
executive authority from the presidency in the name of protecting and leading the 
revolution. The neutral stance of the Tunisian military, which had no interest in 
assuming power to maintain its interests, paved the way for civilian authority to 
manage the transition from Ben Ali’s rule, sparing the country the trouble of 
transferring power from the military to civilian government. In contrast, the army 
has been an important actor in Egyptian and regional affairs since Muhammad Ali 
(1805–1848), the founder of modern Egypt, established a large army, modelled after 
European military forces, and supplied by modern industries and institutions to be a 
nucleus of reform (Marsot 1984; Overton 1971). By the time of the uprising, the 
Egyptian military, empowered by the regime’s heavy investment in it, refused to 
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relinquish power and intervened to preserve its economic and political interests. In 
the event, the course of the post-Mubarak “transition” was dictated by institutions of 
the ancien regime led by the SCAF. The scope of competitive politics was narrowed 
to Parliament and the Presidency, institutions contested even under Mubarak. There 
was no challenge to the substantive power of the ancien regime embedded in the 
military, bureaucracy, judiciary and the police which effectively fragmented the 
social forces that drove the 2011 uprising, leaving them, unable, for example, to 
form a united front to draft a new constitution.  
In Tunisia, there was no strong coercive apparatus to dictate the rules of 
transition, or intervene to tilt the balance of power between deadlocked oppositional 
forces. Hence, civil society could facilitate political negotiation and sometimes stop 
certain forces from dominating the political process. As such, adversarial political 
forces could bargain and negotiate more effectively. For example, they implemented 
a process of establishing commissions to deal with corruption, human rights 
violations, and, crucially, a high commission to manage democratic reform and 
elections. This last commission created the electoral rules and oversight organization 
to carry out elections to the Constituent Assembly which took place in October 
2011. There was, no doubt, substantial rivalry between different political parties and 
organizations, especially between the Islamist Nahda party and other secular and 
human rights groups, over seats in the Assembly and whether decision-making 
would be majority- or consensus-based. In the event, Nahda secured a majority in 
the Assembly. But its victory did not mean an Islamist monopoly of the drafting of 
the new Constitution because decision-making would not be majority-based and 
Nahda chose not to dominate decision making so as not to isolate itself from the 
non-Islamists. Instead, Nahda, headed a coalition government that included two 
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other major parties, the Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol. This “troika” led 
the transitional phase. In fact, such an experience of cross-party cooperation dates 
back to 2005 when the Tunisian opposition formed the October 18 Collectif – 
represented by secular, Islamist, leftist, and human rights groups – to confront Ben 
Ali with demands for reform. In the case of the “troika coalition”, power-sharing 
was achieved by Nahda’s leadership while other secular leaders respectively 
assumed the presidency and led the Constituent Assembly. A notable achievement 
of post-Ben Ali politics, power-sharing saved prevented the Tunisian government 
from ending in the kind of “zero sum” stalemate that ensnared Egypt’s MB and its 
supporters on one hand, and the old regime and anti-MB masses on the other.   
 It mattered, too, that the Islamists during Ben Ali’s rule had been forced 
underground or into exile so that Tunisia’s secular and liberal forces had not had to 
face, and therefore did not fear, the electoral strength of the Islamists. Thus, many 
secular and liberal parties in Tunisia eschewed anti-Islamist rhetoric in their 
electoral campaigns or struggles with Nahda. Indeed, center-left parties that were 
not anti-Islamist performed better in elections than parties that resorted to 
anti-Islamist rhetoric. Hence, the Congress for the Republic, and Ettakatul were 
willing to form a coalition government with Nahda, a move that enabled the major 
parties to compromise on various issues. In turn, Nahda did not regard 
power-sharing with liberal forces to be a threat to its own future, unlike the MB in 
Egypt which was locked in a bitter conflict with state institutions, rival parties, and 
other anti-Brotherhood forces. Secondarily, a “Salafi factor” aggravated the fear of 
the Islamists in Egypt where the Salafis won a fifth of the parliamentary seats, but 
lessened it in Tunisia where the Salafis did not contest in the elections. To that 
extent, the Salafis’ presence or absence weighed on the prospects of 
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cross-ideological coordination. After the first referendum on amending Egypt’s 1971 
Constitution, the “Yes” vote mobilized by the Islamists made it clear to 
non-Islamists that hastily held elections would result in a Parliament controlled by 
the Islamists and remnants of the Mubarak’s National Democratic Party with the 
blessings of the SCAF.  
 
More broadly, the absence of strong state actors after Ben Ali’s fall 
necessitated a process of establishing institutions to manage a new pluralistic 
political spectrum. The process allowed political parties and civil society to create 
on January 26, 2011 the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution from 
an alliance of 28 associations. Among those were the General Confederation of 
Tunisian Labor (UCGT), the Association of Judges, and the Bar Association 
(Mccurdy 2011). Tunisians developed other “transition institutions.” There was, 
notably, the High Authority for the Achievement of the Revolution’s Objectives, 
Political Reform, and Democratic Transition (HIROR) which was composed of 
political parties and civil society groups and which issued decrees related to political 
parties, associations and electoral laws. To take a far-reaching example, HIROR’s 
formula for electoral contestation accommodated small parties by creating a 
relatively large numbers of seats per district and requiring no electoral threshold to 
enter parliament which permitted more potential winners from all parties (Sarsar 
2013). This electoral formula, used in first post-Ben Ali elections to the Constituent 
Assembly in 2011, did not allow the Islamists to get a majority of the seats but 
compelled political forces to negotiate many core issues prior to the drafting of the 
Constitution. The framework of compromise and processes of negotiations were 
facilitated by the breakdown of the Ben Ali era institutions and the relative cohesion 
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of the new political elite. In fact, a shared commitment to democratic rules and 
dismantling the old regime’s institutions encouraged the political elite to accept 
inclusive politics that would allow all political forces to gain from the electoral 
process. To some extent, the cohesion of the new political elites was derived from 
their past intensive dialogues, mostly during their exile in France, about the 
principles that should guide Tunisia after Ben Ali. It helped the transition that 
Tunisia’s civil society was represented by Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) 
and other secular and liberal groups that kept track of the government’s performance 
through protests and dialogue (Bellin 2013).  
   
In that manner, Tunisian parties and civil society organizations that 
displayed strong cohesion in the uprising coped well with divisions created by 
post-Ben Ali politics and averted dangerous polarization. Their Egyptian 
counterparts failed badly in this regard. In their post-Mubarak politics, Egypt’s 
non-Islamist secular and liberal forces failed, as it were, to develop into 
institutionalized political forces that could participate in negotiations, compromises 
or coalitions with the Islamists. Instead, the coordination and collective actions that 
they showed during the uprising collapsed into distrust and enmity after Mubarak’s 
fall. This led to disastrous polarization between the MB, on one side, and 
non-Islamist forces and, eventually the state institutions, on the other. The Egyptian 
uprising, in neither dismantling the ancien regime nor creating new institutional 
mechanisms to lead the transition, permitted the so-called “deep state” to reassert 
itself while the deepening polarization led many non-Islamists to side with the 
military against the MB.  
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Ironically, it was a swift, SCAF-endorsed free-and-fair electoral 
competition-based democratic transition that exacerbated the polarization by 
disadvantaging most of the revolutionary forces due to their lack of electoral 
organization. Crucially, moreover, the Islamists had little incentive to compromise 
with weak, unorganized and divided non-Islamist forces. The MB won all the 
elections although real power still lay in the institutions of the old regime, not those 
won through elections. When it labored to survive authoritarian rule, when electoral 
victory was unimaginable, the MB employed a patient, gradualist approach to 
political participation. But Mubarak’s overthrow precipitously created a political 
opening that pushed the MB away from its gradualist approach. Now, in free and 
fair elections, when victory had become a viable option (Brown 2012), the MB 
seemed ready to discard its well-known slogan, ‘Participation, not domination.’  
Also hindering the MB’s cooperation with other forces was the rise of a 
conservative leadership in the MB prior to 2011. The rise was partly forced by the 
heavy repression that the Mubarak regime unleashed against the MB’s reformists 
after its members had won around 20 per cent of the seats in Parliament in 2005. In 
2007, the constitution was amended to prevent the MB from making further 
electoral gains. Within the MB, the response to repression widened the rift between 
conservatives, who feared for the survival of the movement, and reformists who 
pressed for political participation and openness. As political space was reduced, so 
the Islamists’ reformists were weakened vis-à-vis their conservatives. The growing 
influence of figures such as Mahmoud Izzat and Mahdi Akif in the MB’s Shura 
Council and the Leadership Bureau, the results of MB’s internal election in late 
2009, and the election of Muhammad Badie as its new leader in 2010 handed control 
to the seniors and conservatives. The struggle between conservatives and reformists 
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was compounded by the defection of important reformists, such as Deputy General 
Guide Muhammad Habib, Leadership Bureau member Abdul Mun‘im Abul Futuh 
and certain prominent leaders of the 1970s, who accused the leadership of violating 
the MB’s regulations and illegally engineering Badie’s ascent. 
After Mubarak, with little encouragement to compromise with other 
political forces or to be content with partial victory, the MB’s conservative 
leadership decided to support the SCAF’s transition plan and declined to join 
anti-SCAF protests. Soon, the MB became preoccupied with the procedural aspects 
of transition as opposed to the task of building political alliances at which their 
reformist leaders were masters under authoritarian rule. In a way, the conservative 
leadership was correct: the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party won every election – 
the constitutional referendum (March 2011), parliamentary elections (2011–2012), 
elections to the Shura council (2012), presidential election (2012), and another 
constitutional referendum (December 2012). In another sense, all that was a Pyrrhic 
victory: the more handily the MB won, the more polarized was Egyptian society 
between Islamists and non-Islamists. The MB steadily lost a large part of the 
populist legitimacy and sympathy they had garnered under authoritarian rule. Above 
all, its victory in isolation left the MB incapable of creating and leading broad 
alliances, which might have been the only feasible way to maintain the momentum 
of the 2011 uprising against the “deep state.” 
The split between Islamists and non-Islamists was aggravated by an 
ideological legacy of distrust that had long been sown among Egypt’s dissident 
forces. All previous regimes cultivated a fear of Islamism and offered themselves as 
the only bulwark against an Islamist takeover. From 2007 onwards, for example, 
relentless media campaigns associated terrorism with the MB’s ideology (Shehata 
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and Stacher 2007). On their own, non-Islamist forces had already noted the MB’s 
electoral capacity since the 1980s when some parties took advantage of it to enter 
Parliament. But the apprehensions cut both ways after the uprising. The secularists 
feared an Islamist takeover of the state through elections while the Islamists dreaded 
being forced back underground by future secular regimes. At the same time, the 
revolutionary youth was afraid of being overwhelmed by a triumphant MB majority 
while the secular forces, watching the MB’s collaboration with the SCAF, were 
frightened of an MB-SCAF alliance. In these circumstances, there was no national 
coordination to manage a transition from uprising to stable democracy. 
 
In the space of a year, the balance of power decisively tilted against the 
MB. The Islamists had organization, societal outreach and electoral victories. Yet, 
the old regime retained control of state institutions – the military, police, judiciary, 
media, and bureaucracy – which enabled the SCAF to dictate the rules of politics. 
Indeed, when the SCAF acquiesced to Mubarak’s ouster, the former claimed the role 
of protecting the revolution. The SCAF claimed the same when turning against 
Mursi, making it possible for many anti-Mursi or anti-MB forces to welcome the 
coup as the SCAF’s move to guide Egypt’s transition. Between the overthrow of 
Mubarak and that of Mursi, the SCAF had grasped de facto executive power, 
leaving an elected civilian president shorn of centralized power and real authority. In 
other words, the popular mobilization against the regime in 2011 deposed the 
president and some of his associates but did not dismantle state institutions or curb 
the power of the military. When President Muhammad Morsi tried to prevent the 
military and the judiciary from undermining his presidency, by issuing his 
constitutional declarations of November 22, 2012, it was, arguably, “too little, too 
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late.” Mursi’s move to grant the presidency extraordinary powers that would place it 
beyond judicial review – in a word, to centralize power in his office – backfired, 
upsetting non-Islamist forces and antagonizing the military, providing a pretext for a 
subsequent coup. In the end, the “Egyptian Spring” was not a revolution, as Asef 
Bayat astutely noted, only a ‘refolution’, or an uprising that ‘push[ed] for change for 
reforms in, and through, the institutions of the existing regimes’ (Bayat 2013: 53). 
 
In retrospect, Islamists and non-Islamists alike ended up being reformist, 
not revolutionary. They shared a failure to go beyond a quick but faulty transition 
that diverted the focus of the uprising from battling the state to fighting themselves, 
from striving for substantive democratization to engaging in divisive electoral 
competition. From the beginning, the uprising was loosely unified by broad 
demands. Divided along political and class lines, the uprising lacked strategic 
cohesion or revolutionary organization that could have forced through a transition 
independently of the SCAF. As Bayat has further observed, the forces of the 
uprising did not have strong agency or clear plans. They could not move towards 
radical change. Indeed, ‘the demands for “change”, “freedom” and “social justice” 
were so loosely defined that they could even be appropriated by the 
counter-revolution’ (Bayat 2013). Unlike them all, the SCAF was clear about its 
interests. Those lay in maintaining the supra-constitutional status, which the military 
had enjoyed under previous presidents (who came from the military) and which it 
proceeded to enshrine in the constitution to ensure its complete control of matters 
related to the armed forces, including the defense budget and USA-supplied military 
assistance. The SCAF preserved the old regime’s institutions, including the 
bureaucracy, the state owned enterprises in which former officers are embedded, the 
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police, the state-owned media and the judiciary. The SCAF proceeded to immunize 
their autonomy from unfavorable electoral outcomes. 
 
Syria and Libya 
Uprisings in Libya and Syria did not even lead to anything like the transitions seen 
in Tunisia and Egypt. Although the Gaddafi and Asad regimes showed some 
similarity in their responses to popular uprisings, the outcomes were quite different. 
Whereas Gadaffi’s regime fell quickly, Asad’s has manifested unity and strength so 
far.  
Syria differs from other countries in the Middle East in that the Asad regime 
had always conflated its identity with that of the Syrian state. Indeed, prior to 2011, 
Syria was ideologically and institutionally identified with the Asad regime. Before 
its independence from France in 1946, Syria was merely a geographical expression – 
it did not constitute a unified state or separate political entity and lacked an 
exclusive central authority that served as a focus of identity and loyalty for the 
population. This accounted for a succession of military coups (more than ten 
successful ones between 1949 and 1970) and the rising influence of various military 
factions in politics and power struggles. However, after the last coup in 1970, Hafez 
al-Asad took power and ushered in new regional, economic and political shifts that 
consolidated his rule and prevented the recurrence of military coups and 
factionalism within the ruling Baath Party and the army. Since then, the Asad 
regime had counted on a wider set of state institutions with more power-sharing 
mechanisms and a larger scope of co-optation. As Hinnebusch notes, the Ba‘th Party 
and the presidency share power that rests on three overlapping pillars: ‘the party 
apparatus, the military-police establishment and the ministerial bureaucracy. 
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Through these interlocking institutions, the top political elite seeks to settle 
intra-elite conflicts and design public policy, and through their command posts, to 
implement policy and control society’ (2001: 111). The Ba‘th Party apparatus 
penetrates all state institutions and civil society organizations while the party’s 
military organization exercises political control over its military members 
(Hinnebusch 2011). Hence, the ruling coalition and the political system in Syria are 
far more institutionally interlocked than their counterparts in other authoritarian 
Arab regimes. As such, preserving the integrity of the coalition becomes critical to 
the survival of the regime and its institutions.  
To survive in such a structure, other institutions also strive to maintain their 
co-optative capacity (Stacher 2012). Thus, elite co-optation is not the burden of the 
ruling party alone, as in Egypt, but an onus on all state institutions that must directly 
recruit support for the regime. In short, the regime ‘overcomes’ the heterogeneity of 
Syrian society and opposition by creating its opposite – a cohesive unitary regime. 
Such a coalition makes it difficult for anyone to attempt a coup without risking his 
own survival. This explains why no state institution has attempted to take over the 
presidency to ride out the crisis as happened in Egypt. 
Another crucial feature of regime cohesion is the unquestioning support the 
regime receives from the coercive apparatus and the ruling inner circle, a highly 
sectarian institution that is tightly controlled and represented by the Asad clan. This 
has been ensured by the presence of highly trained and loyal units inside the military 
and the security services, such as the Republican Guard and the Fourth Armored 
Division. Their carefully selected leaders are commanded by officers who belong to 
the president’s own family and clans such as the Makhloufs and Shaleeshs (Gambil 
2006). Indeed all key posts in the military and security services are controlled by 
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closely related families. For instance, the president’s brother, Maher, commands the 
Republican Guard (an elite force whose six brigades protect the regime from 
domestic threats) and heads the fourth armed division (one of the army’s best 
equipped and most highly trained forces). The president’s brother-in-law Asef 
Shawkat, who was killed in a bomb blast in July 2012, was the former commander 
of the intelligence agency and deputy Chief of Staff of the Syrian military. Under 
Hafez al-Asad, state building meant consolidating his authority and creating a 
cohesive regime by conflating its identity with that of the state. Hence, any attempt 
to dislodge the regime was treated as a challenge to the state and drew brutal 
repression without fear of elite or institutional defection. Asad’s regime grounded its 
preservation on a cohesive elite structure of power in direct control of state 
institutions, a cohesive business sector dependent on the regime, and the adoption of 
violence as a modality of governance. Yet such a regime could not flexibly reform 
or allow for political maneuvering in the face of popular protest. Consequently, it 
would only resort to all-out repression to root out the opposition.  
The tendency of the international media to play up a Shia-Sunni civil war 
obscures the social and regional reality that forms the “big picture” of the conflict. 
In the absence of a unified political identity or community, the fragmentation of 
Syrian society along sectarian, ethnic, regional and class lines prevented the 
conception of a national movement that could overthrow the regime in 2011. Most 
importantly, a rural-urban divide has hindered the development of a nationwide 
movement (as emerged in Tunisia and Egypt) to force the Syrian political elite to be 
wary of using heavy repression. The geography of the protest movement 
demonstrates its class roots – most of the areas that witnessed huge popular protests 
were economically underdeveloped and marginalized (International Crisis Group 
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July 2011). Owing to the enduring stability of the Syrian state under the Asad 
regime, the prospects of creating and consolidating a strong Syrian identity were 
undermined by the Baath Party’s very mottos that advocated not national but 
supra-state, supranational identity and secularism, which served to legitimate a 
minority regime. Over the years, the regime became increasingly cosmopolitan and 
severely neglected its original, rural, base of support. For many in Damascus, 
Aleppo and other well-off cities on the coastal side of the country, the popular 
uprising was a threat to their status and life. 
Personalized rule in Syria was similar to Gaddafi’s rule in Libya. Gaddafi, 
too, did not invest in institution- and state building projects. Yet, unlike Syria, Libya 
was not dominated by an ideological ruling political party that would claim a broad 
base of political support. Instead, Ghaddafi consolidated his rule by dispensing 
patronage to kin and clan (Anderson 1990; Vandewalle 1998). Unlike Syria before 
the 2011 uprising, moreover, Libyan society’s extensive reliance on kinship 
networks for access to goods and services shaped a structure of concentrated and 
exclusive power. To sustain that structure of power, Gaddafi manipulated and 
fractured society along tribal, geographical and social class lines (Baxly 2011; 
Lacher 2011) and weakened and divided state institutions to preempt the rise of 
other centers of power. Even the military was deliberately kept weak, ill-equipped 
and de-politicized. Instead of assigning security tasks to the armed forces, the 
Gaddafi regime created security service sectors. Hence, the military easily split 
when the “Libyan Spring” commenced. As a result, it might be argued, Gaddafi’s 
state/regime capacity was almost non-existent compared to Asad’s so that a grave 
crisis produced a disunited regime quickly deserted by state institutions to which the 
regime had very weak links. With that, the Ghaddafi regime had no institutions that 
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could co-opt its opponents to secure its survival. Whereas Asad’s careful design of 
loyal state institutions prevented the rise of institutional defections, Ghaddafi’s 
reliance on tribal alliances came to an end as entire tribes defected and gave 
momentum to the uprising in 2011.  
Perhaps not coincidentally, post-Gaddafi Libya lacks a strong 
institutionalized regime that bears some continuity between the regime’s executive 
institutions and the transitional authorities. For that matter, the legacy of Gaddafi’s 
patronage politics has aggravated the regional division between the privileged and 
the neglected. After his fall, Gaddafi’s former power and authority was diffused to 
local power centers that now vie for power at local and national levels (Sawani 
2012). Consequently, transition in Libya has not led to political contestation over 
drafting a Constitution, say, or controlling state institutions. Rather the contestation 
revolves around resources and political power. To that extent, there is no explicit 
ideological conflict between Islamists and non-Islamists in Libya. Here, Islamists 
were not institutionally embedded in society and state as in Egypt where the MB 
long operated as a social movement running charity works and building support 
networks (Wickham 2002). Under Ghaddafi, outright repression choked off all 
expressions of political pluralism and civil society, including those of Islamists. In 
fact, Islamists do not do well in tribal society where tribal identity supersedes 
ideology and voting is more likely to follow tribal rather than ideological lines. To 
that extent, strong tribal alliances in Libya diminished the MB’s chances in 
post-Ghaddafi elections (St John 2013). Moreover, in the Libyan civil war that 
ousted Gaddafi, the Islamists were tainted for being influenced by external quarters, 
especially Qatar. As for elections, Libyans tended to vote along local, personality 
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and familial lines (Holm 2013: 41) even if they were now free to build a state 
without being hindered by inherited institutions.  
In the absence of institutional contestation in Syria and Libya, then, the 
trajectory of uprising shifted towards violence and civil war over resources and 
power. Still there were differences. Libyan society was religiously and ethnically 
homogeneous and warlords were not common because regional actors were not as 
heavily involved in Libya. In contrast, warlords benefit from the regional struggle 
over Syria, strengthening their personal armies with more manpower and equipment. 
These warlords mobilize along sectarian and religious lines to spread their regional 
dominance. There are other important differences. Libya is an oil state where 
patronage patterns can easily emerge to empower militias at local levels. In addition, 
the Libyan uprising was rooted in territorial divisions which facilitated the 
emergence of rebel-held territory. In contrast, the nationwide institutionalization of 
the Syrian regime allowed Asad to overcome the problems of territory and 
geographic expansion. Thus, Gadaffi’s regime could not extend its violence to 
opposition-controlled areas and delegitimize rebel administration of liberated areas. 
Put another way, Asad could and did inflict high levels of collective punishment 
extensively, an ‘achievement’ that eluded Gadaffi.   
In addition, the high probability of military intervention in Libya boosted the 
prospect of ousting Gaddafi whereas both armed rebels and civilian opposition 
forces in Syria did not have the same option. Although both Syrian and Libyan 
rebels were initially seen to be incapable of waging war, international support and 
relatively early external intervention gave the Libyan rebels shared identity and 
momentum. In Syria international actors hesitated to take a firm stance against the 
regime. The strength of the Syrian army could not be underestimated. The 
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experiences in imposing regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq had also caused 
potential intervening parties to be wary of the rise of Jihadists. The material costs of 
intervention would also be very high and Syria had no oil reserves that could be 
tapped to offset the costs.  
Finally, there are important regional factors. The Asad regime has cultivated 
relations with strong allies in the region for decades (Goodarz 2006). Gadaffi’s 
regime, however, frequently changed its foreign policies, making it difficult to have 
strong regional allies (Solomon 2005). Besides, the Levant is a region that has been 
strenuously contested by international and regional actors. In the past century, the 
dividing lines have been almost unchanged for a Pro-West camp and an Anti-West 
camp. Furthermore, Western recognition and United Nations support (1973) to 
intervene and protect civilians of the anti-Gaddafi’s National Transition Council 
withdrew legitimacy from the regime and defined and unified rebels groups. In 
Syria, the militarization and mobilization of the opposition forces were thought to be 
inadequate vis-à-vis the regime. Moreover, ethnic heterogeneity prevented the rebels 
from controlling and exploiting regions for military gains. Whereas Asad’s 
supporters are unified in backing his regime and its institutions, ill-defined rebel 
groups fragmented along regional, ethnic and sectarian lines lack sustained popular 
support. And the uprising has been discredited too, because of the portrayal of the 
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